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 I. INTRODUCTION  
“The policemen or soldiers are only a gun in the establishment’s 
hand. They make the racist secure in his racism. The gun . . . makes the 
establishment secure in its exploitation. The first problem it seems is to 
remove the gun . . . .“1 Arguably, this statement made by Huey Newton, 
an African American political activist of the 1960s, sets the fifty-year-old 
stage for the argument that my paper intends to make today—America is 
at war with itself and the Constitution is a gun in its arsenal. Like a virus, 
the strain of race relations in this country has lodged within this nation 
such an aggressive attack to our cellular makeup—equal protection, due 
process—that a threat to America’s “national security” has become an 
everyday reality. U.S. judicial precedence, with Korematsu as one of the 
cases at its contemporary helm, creates not only a basis of using race as 
the motivation for antagonistic governmental action, but also sets the 
framework for expanding the war powers of Article II to suit the political 
conveniences of the newest “present emergency.” 
I argue that as long as race or ethnicity functions as the means by 
which the color line is demarcated in America, the United States will 
forever be in a state of crisis. It will forever be shackled with a pressing 
public necessity—a necessity warning of the danger to the country’s 
public health and safety when the American legal system tells us that the 
lives of some citizens matter more than the lives of others. Thus, the 
government is always anticipating its next move, like a chess player 
never losing sight of his need to entrap his opponent’s king, and its 
citizens seem to always be a few moves behind. 
The Constitution is the government’s gun, and national security is 
one of its bullets. It is the Constitution—eloquently crafted, seemingly 
indestructible—that is premised on the objective of protecting liberty and 
unity. But the Constitution, like any manmade creation, is not without 
flaw. Thus, “We the People,” the individuals that establish and sustain 
this Constitution, are neither free nor unified. For if the rights of just one 
person residing under the protection of this contractual document to 
which he or she is assigned, are curbed, inhibited, restrained, or 
infringed, then the nation is no longer liberated, no longer united, and no 
longer secure. For it is the individual, “We the People,” by which and for 
which the U.S. Constitution was established and to which the U.S. 
Constitution must protect. 
                                                                                                             
1 “HUEY NEWTON TALKS TO THE MOVEMENT ABOUT THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY, 
CULTURAL NATIONALISM, SNCC, LIBERALS AND WHITE REVOLUTIONARIES,” THE BLACK 
PANTHERS SPEAK 54 (Philip Sheldon Foner ed., Da Capo Press, 2nd ed. 2002). (emphasis 
added) 
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In this paper, I argue that the expansion of the government’s war 
powers, the current state of U.S. affairs, and the historical jurisprudence 
of the Supreme Court will continue to create a foundation by which 
“national security” will justify the use of race or ethnicity as the primary 
factor in arresting, detaining, or imprisoning members of a racial or 
ethnic group. In Part I, I provide the particular facts of Korematsu and 
the factual backdrop in which the case was decided. In Part II, I provide a 
framing of the issues that Korematsu raises and the applicable level of 
scrutiny that is used to decide similarly situated cases. In Part III, I 
analyze how the government’s interest in national security has found its 
footing in the history of our judicial system prior to the Korematsu 
decision and how the Korematsu Court should have decided. In Part IV, I 
discuss the contemporary issues that often arise by the current state of the 
criminal justice system by reflecting on the history of American policing. 
Finally, in Part V, I conclude with a discussion on the theoretical impact 
of the Korematsu decision on the state of U.S. affairs in regards to race 
relations and national security today. 
II. “FACTS DO NOT CEASE TO EXIST BECAUSE THEY ARE 
IGNORED.”2 
September 1, 1939 marked the start of World War II (WWII).3 Some 
of the most notable causes of WWII consisted of Germany’s resentment 
for signing the Treaty of Versailles, the devastation to the global 
economy by the Great Depression, and the growing number of 
dictatorships in European countries.4 But the infamy of WWII, the 
infamy reigns in the event of the Holocaust—an event that led to the 
genocide of a single racial group (the Jews) by an Aryan regime (the 
Nazis). Although many governments—America included—may not have 
agreed with such an overt persecution of the Jews, it can be argued that 
the Nazis’ white nationalist mentality was one that was globally shared. 
The U.S. joined the war two years later, following two attacks on 
Pearl Harbor by Japanese fighter planes.5 In December 1941, Congress 
declared war on Japan following the December 8th attack on Pearl 
Harbor.6 Being fired from their government jobs and having their 
                                                                                                             
2 ALDOUS HUXLEY, PROPER STUDIES 247 (1927). 
3 World War II Fast Facts, CNN LIBRARY, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/09/world/world-war-ii-fast-facts/ (last updated July 31, 
2015). 
4 Id. 
5 Library of Congress, EXECUTIVE ORDER 9066: EVACUATION AND SEGREGATION, 
http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroommaterials/connections/manzanar/history2.html. 
6 Id. 
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cameras and short-wave radios confiscated were some of the 
repercussions that Japanese Americans had felt in the weeks following 
Congress’ declaration.7 From Japanese Americans in Hawaii being 
accused by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts of helping the 
Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor to newspapers reporting of Japanese-
American sabotage,8 America did not hide its resentment and distrust of 
its Japanese citizens. 
“At the time of the Pearl Harbor attacks, more than 100,000 persons 
of Japanese ancestry were living in California, Arizona, and the coastal 
areas of Oregon and Washington.”9 Most Japanese persons had come to 
the U.S. as immigrants to work the mines, to help develop the railroad 
system, and to be fishermen, farmers, and migrant agricultural laborers.10 
While Japanese immigrants were initially accepted into the U.S. as a 
means of cheap labor, Americans began to resent, mistrust, and 
discriminate against Japanese immigrants over the years.11 With the 
rising increase of Japanese immigration and the heightened stereotype of 
the yellow peril, “the writings of various authors, newspaper editors, 
columnists, and movies in which Asians were portrayed as sinister 
villains engaged in activities of vengeance and treachery” became the 
mirror by which Americans viewed those of Japanese ancestry.12 
On February 19, 1942, before any Act of Congress was promulgated, 
Executive Order No. 9066 authorized: 
[T]he Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders 
whom he may from time to time designate, whenever he 
or any designated Commander deems such actions 
necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such 
places and of such extent as he or the appropriate 
Military Commanders may determine, from which any 
or all persons may be excluded, and with such respect to 
which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or 
leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the 
                                                                                                             
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Jay M. Brown, When Military Necessity Overrides Constitutional Guarantees: The 
Treatment of Japanese Americans During World War II, YALE-NEW HAVEN TEACHERS 
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Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander 
may impose in his discretion.13 
On March 21, 1942, Congress took action in support of President 
Roosevelt’s Executive Order No. 9066 and promulgated legislation that 
provided that: 
[W]hoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit any 
act in any military area or military zone prescribed, 
under the authority of an Executive order of the 
President, by the Secretary of War, or by any military 
commander designated by the Secretary of War, contrary 
to the restrictions applicable to any such area or zone or 
contrary to the order of the Secretary of War or any such 
military commander, shall, if it appears that he knew or 
should have known of the existence and extent of the 
restrictions or order and that his act was in violation 
thereof, be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction 
shall be liable to a fine of not to exceed $5,000 or to 
imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, for 
each offense.14 
A curfew order promulgated pursuant to Executive Order No. 9066, 
was attacked as unconstitutional in Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 
U.S. 81 (1943). The curfew order “subjected all persons of Japanese 
ancestry in prescribed West Coast military areas to remain in their 
residences from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m.”15 The appellant in Hirabayashi 
contended that Congress’s 1942 Act was beyond the war powers of 
Congress and that its application against only Japanese citizens 
amounted to racial discrimination, which is constitutionally 
impermissible.16 Despite these contentions, the Supreme Court “upheld 
the curfew order as an exercise of the power of the government to take 
steps necessary to prevent espionage and sabotage in an area threatened 
by Japanese attack.”17 
In May 1942, under the authority of Executive Order No. 9066 and 
the 1942 Act, an exclusion order—Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34—
was promulgated by the Commanding General of the Western Defense 
                                                                                                             
13 Authorizing the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 
(Feb. 25, 1942) (Executive Order No. 9066); see also Library of Congress, supra note 5. 
14 Act of Congress of March 21, 1942, 56 Stat. 173; Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
15 Id. at 217. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
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Command.18 The order directed that after May 9, 1942, all persons of 
Japanese ancestry should be excluded from a described West Coast 
military area.19 San Leandro, California, residence of Fred Korematsu, 
was one of the military areas designated in the exclusion order.20 
Korematsu was born on American soil. Thus, the Constitution makes him 
a citizen of the United States “by nativity and a citizen of California by 
residence.”21 
Learning of the exclusion order, Korematsu chose to challenge it by 
remaining in San Leandro and continuing his life as an American 
citizen.22 At the advisement of his then Italian American girlfriend, 
Korematsu underwent plastic surgery—altering his eyes in an attempt to 
look less Japanese—and changed his name to Clyde Sarah.23 Despite 
these alterations, Korematsu was recognized for being of Japanese 
ancestry and was arrested on May 30, 1942 for violating the exclusion 
order; and on September 8, 1942, he was convicted in a federal district 
court.24 “No issue was raised as to Korematsu’s loyalty to the United 
States.”25 
III. “ALL LEGAL RESTRICTIONS WHICH CURTAIL THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS OF A SINGLE RACIAL GROUP ARE IMMEDIATELY 
SUSPECT.”26 
“I don’t want any of them [persons of Japanese ancestry] here. They 
are a dangerous element. There is no way to determine their loyalty . . . 
The danger of the Japanese was, and is now—if they are permitted to 
come back—espionage and sabotage. It makes no difference whether he 
is an American citizen, he is still a Japanese. American citizenship does 
not necessarily determine loyalty . . . But we must worry about the 
Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the map.”27 
                                                                                                             
18 Id. 
19 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. 
20 Id. at 215-16. 
21 Id. at 242-43 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
22 OF CIVIL WRONGS AND RIGHTS: THE FRED KOREMATSU STORY, PBS (2001). 
23 Id. 
24 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 236. Evidence of the Commanding General’s attitude toward individuals of 
Japanese ancestry is revealed in his voluntary testimony on April 3, 1943, in San 
Francisco before the House Naval Affairs Subcommittee to Investigate Congested Areas, 
Part 3, pp. 739-40 (78th Cong,. 1st Sess.). (emphasis added) 
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The material issue raised by Korematsu, was whether or not the 
internment, in and of itself, was constitutional28—whether the forced 
arrest, detainment, and imprisonment of a single racial group could 
withstand constitutional scrutiny. However, the Korematsu Court chose 
to frame the issue as whether it was beyond the war power of Congress 
and the Executive to exclude those of Japanese ancestry from the West 
Coast war area at the time that they did.29 But a more brooding issue 
dealing with race relations and national security is implicated by 
Korematsu—”What does it mean to be an American?” In 1903, W.E.B. 
Du Bois, an African American sociologist, introduced the concept of 
double consciousness.30 Du Bois described double consciousness as the 
division of one’s self and how that division prevents an individual from 
truly forming a unified identity.31 Although Du Bois spoke of double 
consciousness in the context of the Black American’s identity, it can be 
argued that a double consciousness exists within any repressed and 
devalued group in America. Accordingly, Korematsu illustrates the 
double consciousness that manifested within the Japanese American 
during WWII—the double consciousness of being both alien and citizen. 
“When a fundamental right is limited by the government, courts 
typically apply the highest level of scrutiny.”32 A law can only surpass 
strict scrutiny if three prongs are satisfied. The first prong requires that 
there must be a compelling state interest.33 The second prong requires 
that narrowly tailored means be used to achieve the compelling state 
interest.34 The third and final prong requires that “the government must 
use the least restrictive means in limiting the people’s rights.”35 
Laws classifying citizens by race are immediately suspect and are 
subject to strict scrutiny. Nevertheless, not all suspect legislation is 
unconstitutional.36 Thus, because a suspect law classifying persons by 
                                                                                                             
28 OF CIVIL WRONGS AND RIGHTS: THE FRED KOREMATSU STORY, supra note 22. 
29 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-18. 
30 W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (Brent Hayes Edwards ed., 2007) 
(1903). 
31 Id. 
32 AMANDA DIPAOLO, ZONES OF TWILIGHT: WARTIME PRESIDENTIAL POWERS AND 
FEDERAL COURT DECISION MAKING 3 (2010). 
33 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (“Where certain ‘fundamental rights’ 
are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only 
by a ‘compelling state interest.’”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1964) 
(“Such a law cannot stand in light of the familiar principle, so often applied by this Court, 
that a ‘governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to 
state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and 
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.’”). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. 
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race was at issue in Korematsu, strict scrutiny was the applicable level of 
review in analyzing the constitutional validity of the legislation. 
IV. KOREMATSU IN CONTEXT: THE SHAPING OF LAW AND 
PUBLIC POLICY BY SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE IN TIMES OF 
NATIONAL CRISIS 
In 1896, at a time when America was endemic with racial prejudice 
and discrimination, the highest court in the land set the legal precedent of 
“separate but equal”—a precedent on which Korematsu would be 
decided almost fifty years later. In Plessy v. Ferguson,37 the Supreme 
Court upheld as constitutional a Louisiana statute that criminalized 
railroad passengers for using facilities that were intended for a different 
race. The majority reasoned that the statute was not unreasonable and 
that the social badge of inferiority worn by the colored race is not one 
which the Constitution can remove.38 In his dissent, Justice Harlan calls 
for a colorblind constitution; one in which the interests of the two races 
require that the common government of all shall not permit the seeds of 
race hate to be planted under the sanction of the law. Despite Justice 
Harlan’s position, the constitutionality of “separate but equal” remained 
the legal framework upon which Korematsu was decided in 1944. 
Notwithstanding the racial animus in America, upholding the 
exclusion order in Korematsu can also be attributed to the Judiciary’s 
expansive interpretation of the war powers in times of military necessity. 
The Supreme Court has historically interpreted Presidential power in a 
manner that generally expands it, not limits it.39 The case of Martin v. 
Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827), was the first case in which the 
Supreme Court specifically described and defined the power of the 
President as Commander-in-Chief.40 The Constitution, the Court 
reasoned, invests the President with the exclusive power to determine 
when the forces of the United States are to be activated during times of 
invasion and civil rebellion.41 The Court held that Congress vests in the 
President exclusive and sole discretion in making determinations of 
emergencies and situations justifying the activation of the military.42 
                                                                                                             
37 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483 (1954). 
38 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551. 
39 ARTHUR H. GARRISON, SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE IN TIMES OF NATIONAL 
CRISIS, TERRORISM, AND WAR: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 41 (2011). 
40 Id. 
41 Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 30 (1827); see GARRISON, supra note 39 at 
42. 
42 Martin, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 31; see GARRISON, supra note 39 a 43. 
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Safeguarding national security is most often synonymous with a war 
on terror—a war that is often waged against a particular racial group. I 
make the contention that a war on terror does not only have to be a war 
between the U.S. and foreign nations; it can also be a war between the 
U.S. and its own peoples. Arguably, the Mott Court supports my 
contention with its endorsement of Executive emergency determinations 
being made during times of international threat (invasion) as well as 
during times of intra-national threat (civil rebellion). Under this rationale 
and with the perception that citizenship ceases to matter for the “enemy 
aliens” of nonwhite America, the U.S. is now and will always be in a 
time of intra-national threat. 
In regards to the development of pre-Korematsu public policy, 
America’s intra-national war on terror can be traced throughout U.S. 
history. In the 1880s, it was against Chinese immigrants when the 
“yellow terror”—the belief that low-paid Chinese workers were taking 
jobs away from whites—coincided with the Chinese Exclusion Act of 
1882.43 In the 1890s, it was against American Indians when the Dawes 
Act attempted to erode tribal integrity and decertify Indian tribes, thus 
making it easier for whites to acquire Indian land.44 In the 1920s, it was 
against southern and eastern European immigrants when Congress—
influenced by the premises of eugenics—passed the Immigration Act of 
1924 in an attempt to control the number of “unfit” individuals entering 
the country and to strengthen the laws prohibiting race mixing.45 During 
                                                                                                             
43 See ANTI-CHINESE LAWS AND THE SPANISH AMERICAN WAR (American 
Anthropological Association 2007) 
http://www.understandingrace.org/history/gov/antichin_law_spanam_war.html. “When 
President Rutherford B. Hayes signed the Chinese Exclusion Treaty in 1880, he 
effectively reversed the open-door policy set in 1868, and placed strict limits on the 
number of Chinese immigrants allowed into the U.S. as well as on the number allowed to 
become naturalized citizens. Congress then enacted the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, 
prohibiting for ten years both immigration from China and the naturalization of Chinese 
immigrants already in the U.S.” 
44 See Am. Anthropological Ass’n, U.S. CONTROL OF AMERICAN INDIANS (2007), 
http://www.understandingrace.org/history/gov/us_control.html (date when last visited 
needed here). “In 1887, Congress passed the Dawes Severalty Act, which imposed a 
system of private land ownership on Native American tribes for whom communal land 
ownership had been a way of life. Individual Indians became eligible to receive land 
allotments of up to 160 acres, together with U.S. citizenship. When the allotment system 
finally ended, Indian landholdings were reduced from 138 million acres in 1887 to only 
48 million acres by 1934.” 
45 See Am. Anthropological Ass’n, EUROPEAN IMMIGRATION AND DEFINING WHITENESS 
(2007) 
http://www.understandingrace.org/history/gov/eastern_southern_immigration.html (date 
when last visited needed here).”Madison Grant and Charles Davenport, among other 
eugenicists, were called in as expert advisers on the threat of “inferior stock” from 
eastern and southern Europe, playing a critical role as Congress debated the Immigration 
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the New Deal Era, it was against largely Blacks and Latinos when the 
promulgation of legislation such as, the GI Bill of Rights and the Social 
Security Act, created and maintained the wealth gap between whites and 
non-whites, which is reflected in rates of home ownership, assets, 
savings and investment even today.46 
In regards to the development of pre-Korematsu legal policy 
following Mott and specifically during the emergence of the Red Scare 
in 1917,47 the Supreme Court continued to develop its jurisprudence of 
deference to the government in times of national crises. The Red Scare 
resulted in the Supreme Court establishing Constitutional boundaries of 
the government’s power to regulate civil liberties, specifically those 
involving political speech and dissent in times of war.48 In 1917, 
Congress passed the Espionage Act, which made it unlawful to gather, 
copy or otherwise secure military information for the purpose of 
providing it to the enemy or otherwise using such information to the 
detriment of the United States or the military.49 
The Act was passed during a heightened time of national fear of 
disloyalty, and its purpose was to gain support for America’s 
involvement in World War I (WWI).50 The constitutionality of the 
                                                                                                             
Act of 1924. The act attempted to control the number of ‘unfit’ individuals entering the 
country by lowering the number of immigrants allowed in to fifteen percent of what it 
had been previously.” 
46 See Am. Anthropological Ass’n, THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND WORLD WAR II 
(2007) http://www.understandingrace.org/history/gov/great_depression_ww2.html (date 
when last visited needed here).”The New Deal programs of the 1930s helped revive the 
U.S. economy after the Great Depression. In 1935, the Social Security Act provided 
retirement benefits for U.S. workers, but domestics and farm workers were initially 
excluded from eligibility, a policy that largely affected blacks and Latinos. The GI Bill of 
Rights or the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, which provided for college and 
vocational education for returning World War II veterans as well as one-year of 
unemployment compensation, resulted in an expansion of the middle class. The GI bill 
also provided loans for returning veterans to buy homes and start businesses, but non-
whites were widely discriminated against in these programs.” 
47 See PBS, PEOPLE & EVENTS: PRELUDE TO THE RED SCARE: THE ESPIONAGE AND 
SEDITION ACTS. (2004), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/goldman/peopleevents/e_redscare.html. “America’s first 
Red Scare, an era of hostility toward perceived “disloyalty”—and relentless government 
repression of radicals and others—began in April 1919. The Red Scare’s roots extended 
deep into the preceding years, almost to the day America entered World War I; 
History.com, RED SCARE, A&E NETWORKS (2010), http://www.history.com/topics/cold-
war/red-scare. As the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States 
intensified in the late 1940s and early 1950s, hysteria over the perceived threat posed by 
Communists in the U.S. became known as the Red Scare. (Communists were often 
referred to as “Reds” for their allegiance to the red Soviet flag.)” 
48 GARRISON, supra note 39, at 91. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 93. 
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Espionage Act of 1917, specifically section 3,51 was highly contested 
within the Supreme Court by cases such as Shaffer52 (holding that, under 
the Espionage Act, a conviction for the mailing of a book containing 
several “treasonable, disloyal, and seditious utterances” was valid), 
Schenck53 (holding that an anti-conscription circular with the intent to 
obstruct the recruiting and enlistment service violated the Espionage 
Act), and Debs54 (holding that a Socialist Party speech with the purpose, 
incidental or not, of opposing the war was not constitutionally protected). 
Thus, this First Amendment jurisprudence continued to advance the 
concept that when civil liberties are limited during national emergencies, 
the Judiciary, more often than not, will defer to the political branches of 
government when they are working together.55 Cases concerning war 
powers become questions of procedure rather than substance.56 This 
approach to wartime judicial decision-making offers less protection to 
individuals because the approach allows the Court to neglect the 
constitutional question presented before it.57 With the emergence of 
WWII, the Supreme Court officially cemented the legal authority to 
legitimize the subjugation of individual rights by government action with 
its decision in Korematsu v. United States.58 
                                                                                                             
51 The Espionage Act (1917), c. 30, tit. 1, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219; see also Digital 
History, THE ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1917, Digital History ID 1904 (2014) 
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=3904. “The 
Espionage Act of 1917, § 3, provides that: ‘Whoever, when the United States is at war, 
shall willfully make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere 
with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States or to 
promote the success of its enemies and whoever when the United States is at war, shall 
willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, refusal of duty, in 
the military or naval forces of the United States, or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting 
or enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of the service or of the United 
States, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not 
more than twenty years, or both.’” 
52 Shaffer v. United States, 255 F. 886 (9th Cir. 1919). 
53 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
54 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). 
55 DIPAOLO, supra note 32, at 2. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 4. 
58 GARRISON, supra note 39, at 201. “The other two internment cases—Hirabayashi v. 
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) and Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.A. 283 (1944)—
addressed two issues arising before and after the exclusion order challenged in 
Korematsu. In Hirabayashi, a curfew order was at issue and in Endo, a retention/detention 
order was at issue. In both Hirabayashi and Korematsu, the Court held that the President 
had the power to authorize a policy of curfew and exclusion followed by detention in 
time of war. However, the Court held in Endo that the internment of loyal Japanese 
Americans could not be supported by the fact that proposed relocation communities 
refused to accept the released Japanese Americans.” Id. 
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The anti-civil liberties ruling made in Korematsu not only sheds light 
on the power of the “Jim Crow” era in which the Justices of the Supreme 
Court sat, but also on the danger to individual rights caused by national 
security interests. In light of the racial antagonism implications and the 
national security interests surrounding Korematsu, the Supreme Court 
failed to apply the proper judicial standard.59 Although the Supreme 
Court purported to apply strict scrutiny, the Court instead applied the 
minimal standard of rational basis review—whereby a law is upheld if it 
is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.60 Accordingly, if the 
Supreme Court had properly applied strict scrutiny, then it should have 
found Executive Order No. 9066 and the 1942 Act to be unconstitutional. 
As aforementioned in Part II, for a law to pass under strict scrutiny, 
the government must be advancing a compelling state interest, and the 
means by which the interest is to be achieved must be narrowly tailored 
and least restrictive in limiting individual rights.61 In Korematsu, national 
security was determined to be a necessary and crucial government 
objective, and thus the “compelling interest” prong was met. Justice 
Black, former member of the Ku Klux Klan,62 reasoned that the military 
authorities’ apprehension of grave, imminent danger to the public safety 
justified a compelling interest.63 Arguably, Justice Black fails to address 
the “narrowly tailored” and “least restrictive” prongs of the strict scrutiny 
analysis. However, some may reason that Justice Black’s remark that 
“the exclusion order had a definite and close relationship to the 
prevention of espionage and sabotage”64 was his attempt at meeting the 
“narrowly tailored” and “least restrictive” prongs of the test. I disagree. 
In order to meet the “narrowly tailored” and “least restrictive” 
prongs under strict scrutiny, (1) the law should not be under/over-
inclusive and (2) there cannot be a less restrictive alternative to achieve 
the same interest.65 The exclusion order was neither “narrowly tailored” 
                                                                                                             
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 202. 
61 DIPAOLO, supra note 32, at 3. 
62 CIVIL LIBERTIES V. NATIONAL SECURITY IN A POST-9/11 WORLD 150 (M. KATHERINE 
B. DARMER ET. AL., eds.2004). 
63 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218. 
64 Id. (emphasis added) 
65 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (“Such a law cannot stand in light of the familiar 
principle, so often applied by this Court, that a ‘governmental purpose to control or 
prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by 
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected 
freedoms.’”); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (“[E]ven though the 
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by 
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more 
narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of 
less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.”). 
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(in that it was over-inclusive in reaching more people, non-citizens and 
citizens of Japanese ancestry, than was necessary) nor “least restrictive” 
(in that a less restrictive means of individual determination of disloyalty 
was available to achieve the government’s interest). By upholding the 
enforcement of the exclusion order merely on the reasoning of 
Hirabayashi, the Court abandons its duty to apply strict scrutiny.66 It is 
evident that the wholesale removal of a single racial group is overly 
broad and thus unconstitutional.67 Therefore, the true error of the Court 
was in failing American citizens at an important time and at an important 
juncture by applying a weak judicial standard in the protection of 
Constitutional rights.68 
Since the Supreme Court’s ruling, Korematsu has been widely and 
severely criticized on the premise that it dodges a more serious, 
underlying, constitutional question in its upholding of a race-specific 
statute disadvantaging a racial minority.69 In 1984, a federal district court 
overturned Korematsu’s conviction on the ground that the government 
had “knowingly withheld information from the courts when they were 
considering the critical question of military necessity.”70 Four years later, 
Congress enacted legislation acknowledging the “fundamental injustice” 
of the evacuation and providing restitution to individuals that were 
forced to leave their homes.71 Although the Korematsu decision has not 
been overruled, it is not remembered for its holding but arguably for 
setting the precedence that statutes that are facially discriminate against 
racial minorities are constitutionally troubling and must be challenged.72 
V. KOREMATSU SETS THE STAGE FOR THE AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM’S INTRA-NATIONAL WAR ON TERROR 
The structure of the American criminal justice system has always 
been in controversy. One particular issue with the system is the 
government’s use of preventive detention. Thus, an issue that may be 
framed is whether it is beyond the government’s power to use preventive 
techniques to maintain social control and to ensure the security of its 
citizens. But a more brooding issue dealing with the criminal justice 
system and how it allocates criminal liability to its citizens is whether 
some of us are born a suspect? It was President Johnson who called for a 
                                                                                                             
66 GARRISON, supra note 39, at 218. 
67 Id. at 202. 
68 Id.at 220. 
69 GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 531 (5th ed. 2005). 
70 Id.; See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984). 
71 See, Pub. L. No, 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (1988). 
72 Id. 
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“War on Crime,” who saw the urban policeman as the “frontline soldier.” 
Despite the unconstitutionality of ordinances that criminalize status 
instead of conduct, revamped and revitalized laws take their places . . . 
hoping that this time they will be able to withstand judicial scrutiny. 
Fifty years later, and the crime is still the same . . . most often, it is to be 
black . . . to be black with other blacks . . . to be black and wear the same 
colors . . . to be black in a designated area. The crime is one of status . . . 
of identity . . . it is to be a mere member of a people . . . it is to be born a 
suspect. 
“Contemporary detention jurisprudence has developed across several 
contexts including pretrial detention, commitment of the mentally ill, and 
detention of sexual predators, undesirable aliens, and unlawful 
combatants.”73 Instead of being seen as a form of punishment, 
contemporary detention is seen as regulatory. When we call a crime by 
another name does it make it less egregious? What about the laws that 
are in place that defend these status crimes? What is required of a statute 
in order for it to “punish” or “regulate” the action or inaction of a 
citizen? How does the government use national security to maintain the 
use of a constitutionally bankrupt system? 
The use of preventive detention puts the traditional guarantees of 
criminal justice at risk. Where the concern is with prevention and not 
punishment, the important assessment consists in an inquiry into an 
individual’s personality rather than into the criminal act. The less 
relevant the criminal act is for the judicial decision, the less effective the 
traditional safeguards.74 Thus, it appears that preventive detention passes 
judicial review and most importantly constitutional muster because it 
falls under the guise of regulation rather than punishment. It can be 
argued that “a statute is in excess of the power vested in the Legislature 
[when] it makes a mere intention, unexecuted, and not connected with 
any overt act, a crime.”75 For a law to subject individuals to just 
punishment it must be for some past voluntary wrongful or potentially 
harmful conduct specified in advance by statute.76 
Although the purposes of criminal punishment are the subject of 
controversy, there is the consensus that desert is a necessary condition 
for punishment.77 If punishment is premised on “the requirement of an 
                                                                                                             
73 Michael L. Corrado, Sex Offenders, Unlawful Combatants, and Preventive 
Detention, 84 N.C. L. REV. 77, 85 (2005); accord MICHAEL L. CORRADO, PRESUMED 
DANGEROUS: PUNISHMENT, RESPONSIBILITY, AND PREVENTIVE DETENTION IN AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE(2013). 
74 Id. 
75 Proctor v. State, 176 P. 771, 772 (Okla. Crim. App. 1918). 
76 See JOHN KAPLAN, ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2012). 
77 See id. at 115. 
2017] A NEVER ENDING STATE OF EMERGENCY 121 
 
act,” then people cannot be punished for falling into some demographic 
category that is statistically likely to commit crime or for exhibiting 
some condition which tends to be a predictor of future crime.78 
Therefore, individuals cannot and should not be punished for their status. 
And yet, so many slain black and brown bodies litter the streets of this 
country. What is their crime? The crime often tends to be who they are 
and not what they did. 
When the assessment consists of an inquiry into an individual’s 
personality rather than into the criminal act, the assessment seems to 
dictate the occurrence of a status crime. An individual’s personality 
expounds on one’s characteristics, thought patterns, and ideals. To assess 
someone’s personality in determining whether or not they will be 
“detained” and whether or not their constitutional rights will be 
diminished is to punish someone for their status. For example, Kansas v. 
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), analyzes the “double track” system in 
which the offender is subjected first to a period of retributive detention, 
or punishment, and then to a period of preventive detention.79 In 
Hendricks, Justice Thomas reasoned that the “liberty interest is not 
absolute” and that the Kansas statutory requirements limited indefinite 
confinement to those with “volitional impairment[s],” making it 
“difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous 
behavior.”80 The Supreme Court upheld the Kansas “double track” 
sexual predator statute as constitutional. 
In the United States, punishment is only punishment if it is 
retributive, and while many crimes are intended to be both punitive and 
preventive, there are clear cases in which the intent (at least the explicit 
intent) is preventive and not punitive.81 Detention becomes a reaction to 
what a person is (i.e., status) rather than what he or she actually did (i.e., 
conduct).82 The problem is that detention, whatever its aim, is always an 
impediment on the individual’s right to liberty and due process of the 
law. 
In addition to the affect that preventive detention has on certain 
members of society (specifically, minorities), criminal law reform is also 
a subject that is addressed. One particular subset of criminal law reform 
is the reforming of police practices. When searching for effective 
alternatives to the way that police practices are implemented currently, it 
is crucial that the history of these practices is explored in order to guide 
                                                                                                             
78 Id. at 116. 
79 Corrado, supra note 73. 
80 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997); accord Corrado, supra note 78 at 
61. 
81 See Corrado, supra note 73, at xxxi. 
82 Id. 
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the community in effectively brainstorming new strategies. The most 
heavily discussed issue deals with America’s policing of low-income 
communities and communities of people of color. What has led to so 
many young black and brown children being gunned down by the same 
law enforcement officers who have pledged to serve and protect them? 
The development of police practices in the United States began with 
the use of slave patrols and Night Watches, which later became the 
model by which modern police departments have functioned.83 The slave 
patrols and the Night Watches were designed to control the behaviors of 
minorities.84 Even before the first formal slave patrol was created in the 
Carolina Colonies in 1704, the South continuously used the practices of 
patrols and Night Watches to capture runaway slaves and return them to 
their slave masters.85 After the Civil War, state law enforcement officers 
would work with vigilante groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan—”which 
notoriously assaulted and lynched Black men for transgressions that 
would not be considered crimes at all, had a White man committed 
them”—to run and manage the slave patrols.86 
In the late nineteenth century, the rise of the new working class and 
the frequent occurrence of major strikes and riots in American cities like 
Chicago resulted in municipalities hiring armed men to impose order.87 
In each of the major strikes and riots, the police attacked strikers with 
extreme violence.88 This ideology of order that developed in the late 
nineteenth century echoes down to today—except that today, poor black 
and Latino people are the main threat, rather than immigrant workers.89 
What, if anything, has changed since the eighteenth century development 
of the slave patrols from the current police practices today? And how has 
it impacted the way America deals with its national security, especially 
with intra-national threats? 
There is arguably no change from the way America was policed over 
three centuries ago to the way that it is policed today. In present day, the 
most marginalized of society, especially black and brown people, have 
been targeted by police officers through strategies, such as stop-and-frisk 
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tactics, racial profiling, selective enforcement policing, and abuse of 
searches and seizures. The way this ideology of American policing has 
developed through history can be viewed most dramatically in the 
militarization of law enforcement officers. The use of military-style 
equipment—weapons and tactics designed for the battlefield—to conduct 
ordinary law enforcement activities—are used by the police routinely, 
across the United States, to force their way into people’s homes, 
disrupting lives and destroying communities.90 In a study conducted by 
the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), the ACLU found that the 
use of paramilitary weapons and tactics primarily impacted people of 
color.  For instance, when paramilitary tactics were used in drug 
searches, the primary targets were people of color, whereas when 
paramilitary tactics were used in hostage or barricade scenarios, the 
primary targets were white.91 
When looking at the way history has shaped present day police 
practices, it is crucial to look at the issue of national security and 
American policing of people of color in a critical and analytical context. 
It is more than the growing number of young black bodies sprawled 
across the American streets. Bodies bloodied, bruised, and breathless. In 
the wake of their death, the community must recognize the issues that 
their passing brings to light. It is recognizing that these young lives have 
been stunted by the criminal justice system . . . by a creature of 
government that should be held accountable for failing the communities 
it serves. It is recognizing that issues such as digital illiteracy, unequal 
access to educational resources, and inability to receive optimal 
healthcare, have been deliberately redlined, redistricted, or rescreened to 
create clear lines of non-access to low-income communities (often 
predominantly communities of people of color). Taking this particular 
                                                                                                             
90 War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing, ACLU 
FOUNDATION 21 (2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/jus14-
warcomeshome-text-rel1.pdf. 
91 Id. at 35. “Where race was known, deployments that impacted people of color (the 
majority being Black) constituted 28 percent of the total, whereas deployments that 
impacted white people constituted 31 percent of the total. A small percentage (6 percent) 
impacted a mix of white people and people of color. Breaking this down further into 
actual numbers of people impacted by SWAT deployments shows that of all the incidents 
studied where the number and race of the people impacted were known, 39 percent were 
Black, 11 percent were Latino, 20 were white, and race was unknown for the rest of the 
people impacted. This means that even though there were more deployments that 
impacted only white people or a mix of white people and minorities, many more people 
of color were impacted. This may relate to the fact that white people were more likely to 
be impacted by deployments involving hostage, barricade, or active shooter scenarios, 
which most often involve domestic disputes impacting small numbers of people, whereas 
people of color were more likely to be impacted by deployments involving drug 
investigations, which often impact large groups of people and families.” Id. 
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viewpoint on the broad issue of national security is crucial to the future 
development of America’s safekeeping. 
VI. RACE RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY TODAY: THE 
LEGAL MURDER OF YOUNG BLACK MEN AND THE IMPLICATION OF 
FERGUSON 
Marcus Tullius Cicero, a Roman philosopher and political theorist, is 
often quoted for his statement inter arma silent leges: in war, the law is 
silent.92 Public policy in post-Korematsu America did not see much 
positive change in the realm of national security and race relations.  
America’s intra-national war on terror raged on, and is arguably still 
raging. 
In the 1950s, it was against Mexicans when “Operation Wetback, a 
project of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, deported 
hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants from the Southwest.93 In the 
1960s and 1970s, it was against non-whites, with the most substantial 
impact on Blacks, when affirmative action became synonymous with 
“reverse discrimination” as whites began to resent opportunities afforded 
nonwhites and U.S. courts began to strike down affirmative action 
programs.94 In the 1990s and early 2000s (post-9/11), it was against 
                                                                                                             
92 DIPAOLO, supra note 32, at 3. 
93 See GOVERNMENT: 1950s-1960s CIVIL RIGHTS ERA AND THE VIETNAM WAR, THE 
RACE PROJECT (2007), 
http://www.understandingrace.org/history/gov/civil_rights_vietnam.html. “In 1954, 
Operation Wetback, a project of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 
deported hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants from the Southwest, in particular 
Mexican nationals. Mexican citizens residing in the U.S. were called wetbacks, a 
derogatory term for Mexican or Central American immigrants that referred to their entry 
into the U.S. by crossing the Rio Grande River, which separates the two countries. The 
project included police sweeps of Mexican-American neighborhoods and random stops 
and ID checks of people in a region populated by many Native Americans and native 
Latinos.” 
94 See GOVERNMENT: 1960s- THE BEGINNING AND THE END OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, 
THE RACE PROJECT (2007), 
http://www.understandingrace.org/history/gov/civil_rights_vietnam.html. “In the late 
1970s, the courts began to strike down affirmative action programs that were designed to 
give minorities an opportunity to compete for federal contracts, by challenging programs 
that utilized “quotas.” The change in the way affirmative action came to be viewed took a 
different tone in the courts. In discrimination lawsuits filed in the 1970s, racist intent was 
almost always denied by defendants. But the courts often relied on statistical patterns as 
evidence of discrimination. However, the standard for proving discrimination 
subsequently changed so that intent became the basis for determining discrimination. By 
the 1980s, the courts had so narrowly defined discrimination that the onus was on the 
victims of racial bias to prove the intent of employers and institutions that had exhibited 
racism in their policies and practices.” 
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“foreigners”—undocumented immigrants, illegal residents, and 
Muslims—when legislation such as, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), the 1996 Welfare Reform bill, and the Patriot Act, 
were designed to thwart terrorism and the social advancement of 
immigrants.95 
But what about today? Which group in the U.S. is now the 
government’s most evident opponent in its war on terror? Today, the 
war, a war that has been waged for over four hundred years, is against 
America’s Black males—Emmett Till, Medgar Evers, Amadou Diallo, 
Trayvon Martin, Jordan Davis, Michael Brown—when their 
advancement in society is thwarted by an institutional racism that is often 
dismissed by the U.S. legal system. “The practice of demonizing African 
Americans dates back to the period of the slave trade and has endured 
despite the reelection of America’s first African American president.”96 
The not guilty verdict rendered in the George Zimmerman trial97 and the 
St. Louis County grand jury’s decision not to indict Darren Wilson98 are 
the latest in a long line of reminders that far too many whites believe that 
blacks, in general, and black males, in particular, are dangerous, thus 
making young black men the faces of crime in contemporary America.99 
Because the Black body is viewed as a site of “pathology,” 
specifically criminal pathology, Black male bodies are ontologically 
truncated and stymied through racist gazes as if they are “guilty of 
                                                                                                             
95 See GOVERNMENT: 1990s-2000s, NAFTA, THE PATRIOT ACT, AND THE NEW 
IMMIGRATION BACKLASH, THE RACE PROJECT (2007), 
http://www.understandingrace.org/history/gov/nafta.html. “In 1992, Congress passed the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) intended to create a free-trade bloc 
among the U.S., Canada and Mexico. However, the agreement raised concerns in the U.S. 
about immigration from south of the border. The 1996 Welfare Reform bill included anti-
immigrant and other measures that eliminated many social services for undocumented 
immigrants. In 2001, the U.S. government initiated a series of immigration policies under 
the Patriot Act that were designed to thwart terrorism after the 9/11 attacks.” 
 
96 Owen Brown, Jr., The Legal Murder of Trayvon Martin and New York City Stop-
and-Frisk Law: America’s War Against Black Males Rages On, 37 WESTERN J. OF BLACK 
STUDIES 258, 258 (2013). 
97 See id. at 260. “On February 26, 2012, George Zimmerman a white male of 
Hispanic descent, shot and killed a teenage black male named Trayvon Martin. 
Zimmerman was acting in the capacity of a neighborhood Watch Captain for a gated 
community in Sanford, Florida. On July 13, 2013, a jury consisting of six women 
acquitted Zimmerman of the charge of second degree murder or the lesser charge of 
manslaughter.” Id. 
98 A St. Louis County grand jury—consisting of nine whites and three blacks—decided 
not to indict local police officer, Darren Wilson, for the fatal shooting of unarmed black 
teen, Michael Brown in August of 2014. See Storyline: Michael Brown Shooting, NBC 
NEWS (2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/michael-brown-shooting. 
99 Brown, Jr., supra note 96, at 260. 
126 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:107 
 
something—some previous crime or sin or moral slippage.”100 America’s 
young black males—the Trayvon Martins and the Michael Browns that 
reside within and outside of the inner cities—are not the problem. 
“Rather the problem is that Blackness is pre-marked and pre-nominated 
as a site of ‘deviance’ vis-à-vis white racist epistemic and axiological 
frames of reference.”101 State or state-sanctioned violence on the Black 
body is “the failure to see Black Americans as unique individuals with 
promise, talents, resources, or even genius that one day might improve 
the republic.”102 
Thus, America’s war against black males rages on,103 and the Black 
American’s defeats—such as, the de-emasculation of Black males during 
slavery, the persistent police brutality against people of color coinciding 
with the over- and under-policing of lower income communities, and the 
growing wealth gap between whites and nonwhites that is continually 
solidified by striking down affirmative action programs—outweigh its 
victories—such as, the Brown104 decision, the 1964 Civil Rights Act,105 
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.106 The contemporary reality of the 
relationship between Black Americans and the criminal (in)justice 
system107 is evidence of my claim that national security has justified the 
use of race or ethnicity as the primary factor in arresting, detaining, or 
imprisoning members of a racial or ethnic group in America. 
Even though Blacks only make up thirteen percent of the nation’s 
population, they comprise forty percent of its prison inmates.108 “Sadly, 
members of law enforcement, judges, and jurors find it difficult to 
empathize with Black defendants and usually believe that members of 
this group ‘get what they deserve.’”109 The New York City Stop-and-
Frisk program can be used as one of the most recent examples to further 
expound on the tenuous relationship between Black Americans and the 
criminal justice system. Championed by Mayor Michael Bloomberg and 
Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly, the rules governing the program 
                                                                                                             
100 George Yancy et al., Interpretative Profiles on Charles Johnson’s Reflections on 
Trayvon Martin: A Dialogue between George Yancy, E. Ethelbert Miller, and Charles 
Johnson, 38 WESTERN J. OF BLACK STUDIES. 1, 2 (2014). 
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102 Id. at 3. 
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104 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
105 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. 
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are delineated in New York State Criminal Procedure Law § 140.50, 
which are based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968).110 “Opponents of stop-and-frisk argue that it creates 
antagonism between law enforcement and the people in the communities 
they are charged with policing.”111 Not only are Blacks and Hispanics 
disproportionately targeted by the program,112 but empirical findings of 
the NYCLU, the Center on Constitutional Rights reveal that blacks are 
policed, arrested, prosecuted, and sentenced more harshly than whites in 
the American criminal justice system.113 
In the wake of this ongoing intra-national war on Black males 
(arguably in the name of “national security”), America is left with the 
visual imageries of state sanctioned violence—of a brutally disfigured 
Black face, one beyond his mother’s recognition, lying motionless in a 
casket; of Black blood splattered across “Jim Crow Must Go” t-shirts in 
the driveway of a man’s home; of a night being riddled with 41 gun shots 
from  a policeman’s firearm, followed by the streets enveloping yet 
another black body; of little Black boys adorned in hoodied sweatshirts 
being racially profiled in gated communities; of a car bursting with the 
melodies of hip hop and brown faces being barreled with bullet holes; 
and of police officers donned in full-fledge riot gear juxtaposed to the 
faces of mostly Black women, men, and children. In order to put an end 
to these historical wars on terror and to the never-ending state of 
emergency which is this nation’s reality, we must remove the gun—we 
must put the civil rights and the civil liberties of American citizens, and 
even of those who reside on U.S. soil, over the American government’s 
continuous expansion of power during times of pressing public necessity. 
                                                                                                             
110 Brown, Jr., supra note 96, at 258. The Terry Court held that: “Under some 
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